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The microfinance industry in Bangladesh currently provides access to credit to around thirteen 
million poor households. This paper describes the factors that led to the scaling-up of microcredit 
in Bangladesh, the impact this has had on the poor, future challenges in Bangladesh and possible 
lessons for other countries. It argues that microcredit plays a significant role in reducing 
household vulnerability to a number of risks and that it contributes to improving social indicators. 
The paper suggests that strategic donor investments in a handful of well-managed institutions that 
offer a simple, easily-replicable financial product could lead to large gains in access to finance for 
the poor. However, this approach could sacrifice other objectives of financial sector development, 
such as product and institutional diversity, which could be promoted after the initial expansion 
has taken place. Governments can also have a crucial role in promoting access to microfinance by 
ensuring macro-economic stability, enforcing a simple regulatory structure and developing 
communications networks that reduce transaction costs. Another lesson is that while visionary 
leadership cannot simply be franchised, the internal management systems that led to the scaling-
up can be replicated in other settings.    2
1.0. INTRODUCTION 
 
The fact that the microfinance industry has been able to provide access to credit, currently, to  
nearly thirteen million poor households in Bangladesh is truly remarkable. There are around 
twelve hundred microfinance institutions (MFI) in Bangladesh (CDF 2002) but the industry is 
dominated by four large MFIs (BRAC, Grameen, ASA and Proshika) that serve around 11.4 
million or ninety percent of all clients. Table 1 illustrates the scale of these institutions. These 
four institutions combined have over $800 million in outstanding loans and around $380 million 
in savings. The differences between the number of borrowers and members reflect differences in 
the variety of services offered by these MFIs. Proshika and BRAC offer a range of services to 
their members, while Grameen and ASA focus on the provision of microfinance services. 
 
After the “big four”, the next largest NGO
2 has 0.7 million clients and there are only ten NGOs 
who have more than 100,000 borrowers. The bottom line is that the majority of the MFIs are 
small (less than five thousand borrowers) and that the bulk of the access to microcredit is supplied 
by the four large MFIs. As such, the experiences of scaling-up discussed here draw primarily 
upon these large MFIs. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2.0. describes the evolution of 
the microfinance industry over the past three decades in Bangladesh. Section 3.0. proposes 
several factors that contributed to its scaling-up. Section 4.0. summarizes the evidence on the 
impact of microfinance on poverty, vulnerability and female empowerment. Section 5.0. 
concludes by discussing  key lessons from the Bangladesh experience. 
 
2.0. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY IN BANGLADESH 
The growth in access to credit by the poor took place in several distinct phases over the last three 
decades. The origins of the current microcredit model can be traced back to action-research in the 
late 1970s, carried out by academics as well as practioners in organizations that were created to 
                                                 
2 Swarnivar Bangladesh 
Organisation Number of 
Members 
Number of 
Borrowers     
Savings       Cumulative 
Disbursement   
Outstanding 
Loan Amount 
Grameen Bank  3.6 3.5 194.1 3,372.5 295.0
BRAC                          4.5 3.8 114.4 2,014.2 219.9
ASA                             2.7 2.5 47.3 1,607.3 232.1
Proshika 2.8 1.5 24.3 464.4 61.3
Total 13.7 11.4 380.0 7,458.4 808.3
Note:  Exchange rate in June 2004: US$1 = Tk60.36
Table 1: Micro-credit portfolios of the 'big four' MFIs in Bangladesh (as of June 2004)
Million Million US$  3
deal with the relief and rehabilitation needs of post-independence Bangladesh. The 1980s 
witnessed a growing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which experimented 
with different modalities of delivering credit to the poor. The various models converged in the 
beginning of the 1990s toward a fairly uniform ‘Grameen-model’ of delivering microcredit. It 
sparked a sharp growth in access to microcredit during this decade. In recent years the standard 
Grameen-model has undergone more refinements in order to cater to different niche markets as 
well as to different life-cycle circumstances.  
 
The 1970s 
Experimentation in providing credit to households considered ‘unbankable’ by the formal 
financial system has its origins a few years after Bangladesh’s independence war in 1971. The 
independence movement gave rise to a new generation of young activists who were keen on 
contributing to the reconstruction of this war-ravaged country. The new government and a myriad 
of aid agencies that arrived on the scene were unable to cope with the scale of destitution and 
non-governmental organizations emerged to meet the challenges. The early years of the NGO 
movement in Bangladesh focused on relief and rehabilitation with an emphasis on community 
development. However, by the mid-1970s, two of the NGOs that would subsequently expand in 
scale, BRAC and Proshika, found that ‘elite capture’ was a serious impediment to their 
development objectives. As a result, a separate focus on the poor through a ‘target-group’ 
approach was introduced. Moreover, an ideological debate within both these organizations began 
to brew, between those who favored ‘economic tools’ (credit, savings etc) to support poverty 
reduction and those who believed that social mobilization against existing injustices would 
suffice and financial services were unnecessary.  
 
Around the same time a team of researchers at Chittagong University, led by Professor Yunus,  
began an action-research program that provided loans to poor households in a few villages. 
Borrowers were mobilized in ‘peer groups’ composed of four or five individuals who were jointly 
responsible for each others repayment. Several of these small ‘peer monitoring groups’ were 
organized into a larger unit which would meet weekly with the primary purpose of repaying loan 
installments. The process of trial and error included combining males and females in the same 
credit group and then changing this to separate groups divided by gender. It also included forming 
‘occupational groups’ but this was dropped in favor of village-based groups. The demand for 
loans grew rapidly and Professor Yunus enlisted the support of the Bangladesh Bank and 
commercial banks to provide the ‘Grameen Project’ – as it was then called – with resources. The   4
success of this experimentation paved the way for the establishment of the Grameen Bank under a 
special ordinance in 1983.  
 
The 1980s 
In the early 1980s several NGOs experimented with different ways of delivering credit. One 
important mode tested was the efficacy of providing loans for group projects compared to 
offering loans to individuals with peer monitoring. The broad lesson was that the latter was more 
effective due to incentives and ‘free-rider’ problems compared with lending to a group. Hence by 
the late 1980s the predominant model became one of providing individual loans to a target group 
of poor households, with peer monitoring and strong MFI staff follow-up.  
 
The Association for Social Advancement (ASA) is a classic example of this shift. Its initial 
emphasis was on forming ‘peoples organizations’ mobilized for social action against oppression. 
It changed to the ‘target group’ approach and then toward the provision of financial services in 
the late 1980s. Now ASA is the fourth largest MFI in Bangladesh in terms of clients and its 
unique low-cost credit delivery mechanism is being replicated in several other countries. ASA 
keeps paperwork requirements to a minimum, has decentralized most decision-making to the field 
and overall has a very lean operation (Choudhury 2003). 
 
The 1980s and early 1990s were also important in the development of management capacity 
within several of the large MFIs  which allowed them to expand their microcredit programs. What 
is particularly interesting is that the development of the know-how and confidence to implement 
large programs arose, in some cases, from the experience of scaling-up programs not related to 
microcredit. For instance in the case of BRAC, the first major experience with a nationwide 
program came about when it implemented an oral rehydration program to combat diarrhoeal 
disease. Thirteen million women were trained to use a simple but effective rehydration solution 





                                                 
3 In addition to this innovative staff incentive system, a detailed evaluation of the oral rehydration 
experience also point to a number of other ‘success factors’ - (i) systematic recruitment and training of 
staff, (ii) an effective feedback loop and the willingness of senior management to learn from the lessons 
from the field and (iii) support from Government, donors and professional experts. (Chowdhury and Cash 
1996).   5
Early to mid 1990s 
The early 1990s was the period of rapid expansion of the Grameen-style microcredit approach 
(Ahmed 2003). The growth was fueled largely by a ‘franchising approach’ whereby new branches 
replicated the procedures and norms that prevailed in existing branches. The product that was 
offered to the client at the time was fairly narrow,  focusing mainly on a standard microcredit 
package offered to all clients. The view was that it was easier to recruit new staff and train them 
quickly in a simple product during a phase when branches were opened at a rapid rate. This 
growth was clearly aided by the high population density and relative ethnic, social and cultural 
homogeneity in Bangladesh.  
 
A notable shift that took place during this expansion phase was a greater emphasis on individual 
borrower accountability for loan repayment and less reliance on peer monitoring. Staff follow-up 
of loans became more rigorous and professional with the use of computerized Management 
Information Systems. Donor funds also contributed to expanding the revolving loan funds for 
MFIs during this expansion phase. Moreover this period saw the emergence of PKSF as a 
wholesale financing institution (see section 3.0). Following this expansion, a geographical 
mapping of microfinance suggests that all districts in Bangladesh have microcredit services, 
though there are many smaller pockets with little or no coverage (e.g. Chittagong Hill Tracts). A 
closer look shows that there is somewhat greater coverage of poor households in the central and 




Mid 1990s onward 
Feedback from the field, academic research and international experience contributed to an 
increasing emphasis on providing diversified financial services for different groups of households 
from the mid 1990s onward. The benefits of a narrow focus on microcredit during the ‘expansion 
phase’ was that it kept costs low, operations transparent and relatively straightforward 
management oversight. However, it became clear that the standard Grameen model of providing 
microcredit with fixed repayment schedules, with standard floors and ceilings on loans sizes, was 
not sufficient to meet the needs of the extreme poor or the ‘vulnerable non-poor’ group.  
 
Moreover, existing microcredit borrowers also required complementary financial and non-
financial services. The standard practice for MFIs until the late 1990s was to collect compulsory 
                                                 
4 PKSF (2003) ‘Maps on Microcredit: Coverage in Bangladesh’ Dhaka    6
weekly savings from their clients, holding the money as a de-facto lump sum ‘pension’ returned 
when a client left the organization. Access to these deposits was otherwise limited, which 
curtailed a potentially important source of consumption-smoothing. Recognizing these limitations 
an increasing number of MFIs in Bangladesh have introduced an open access current account 
scheme in addition to the fixed deposit scheme. Moreover, many MFIs have life insurance 
products whereby outstanding microcredit debts are written off and other benefits are paid 
following the death of a borrower. Non-credit services can also take the form of input supply, 
skill training and marketing support for micro-entrepreneurs
5. A complementary package to 
microcredit can also take the form of providing education for the children of borrowers. Grameen 
Bank for instance has a scholarship program for female secondary education and a student loan 
program for tertiary education. Similarly many MFIs have community health programs, legal 
literacy training and provide information on accessing local resources. Results from a survey of 
310 NGOs conducted in 2003 shows that the typical NGO provides around four services but that 
almost all (92%) provide micro-credit as one of these services – the other common services are 
health, sanitation, education services that are provided by around half of the sampled NGOs 
(Gauri and Galef 2004). 
 
MFIs began to experiment with catering to new niche markets as the traditional microcredit 
business became standardized (and horizontal expansion slowed) and required less attention. For 
instance several NGOs began providing larger loans to ‘graduate’ microcredit borrowers and in 
some cases to households who were not part of the microcredit system but which wanted a micro-
enterprise loan. These loans typically range from 20,000 taka (around $320) to 200,000 taka 
($3,200). Innovative solutions are also emerging to address the problem of access to finance for 
the small enterprise sector. For instance, BRAC established a separate financial institution, 
BRAC Bank, that focuses on lending to the “smaller end” of the small enterprise sector, with 
loans averaging 400,000 taka. 
 
Moreover, evaluation studies pointed out that extremely poor households were struggling to 
benefit from the standard microcredit model, even if they joined the programs. The main reasons 
were: (i) minimum loan floors for a first loan that sometimes exceeded their own perceived needs, 
(ii) fixed weekly loan repayments could be difficult to commit to in light of sharp seasonality of 
                                                 
5 For instance in the sericulture sector BRAC supplies the eggs to the silkworm rearer, plants the mulbery 
trees, trains the entrepreneur in silk rearing, arranges for extension services by a BRAC rearing specialist, 
purchases the cocoons from the rearer from her homestead and supplies these to a BRAC silk reeling 
centre.   7
income, (iii) other members of peer-monitored groups sometimes do not wish to guarantee loans 
for extremely poor households etc and (iv) residing in remote or depressed areas. 
 
Programs that have been developed to cater for these constraints include (i) introducing more 
flexible repayment schedules such as ASA’s Flexible Loan Program, (ii) lowering first loan floors 
so that amounts as small as 500 taka ($9) can be borrowed, (iii) Grameen’s program that offers 
zero interest loans to beggars, (iv) the Resource Integration Center’s program that specializes in 
offering loans to a specific vulnerable group - the elderly poor, (v) various programs that combine 
food aid with microcredit and training e.g. BRAC’s IGVGD program, and (vi) targeting remote 
areas through for instance ASA’s cost-effective mini-branch system and Integrated Development 
Foundations work in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
 
3.0. FACTORS THAT LED TO THE SCALING-UP 
Institution building – leadership, staff incentives and learning by doing 
It is unquestionable that the vision and persistence of the leaders of the NGO/MFI movement are 
a key factor behind the success of the microfinance industry in Bangladesh. Leadership skills 
were instrumental at the initial stages in persuading a skeptical public that providing credit to the 
poor could become a viable and replicable proposition. These skills were equally important 
during the process of scaling-up. These included being able to recruit and motivate staff, 
decentralizing authority away from the center, building management information systems and 
internal controls as well as having the humility to learn from mistakes. Moreover, once the 
leaders of these organizations showed that scaling up is possible, this view became part of the 
staff culture and other staff had the confidence to expand the programs within their own 
jurisdiction.  
 
Staff recruitment, motivation and retention are particularly important for large organizations - 
BRAC for instance employs around 28,000 staff in its various programs, Grameen has around 
12,000 in its microcredit program and ASA’s microcredit program employs around 8,000 staff. A 
critical element in this process is an objective performance evaluation system for staff that is 
linked to career mobility and a myriad of other incentives for staff to perform well both 
individually and in their teams. For instance Grameen Bank has introduced a system of rating 
branch offices based on the achievement of specific targets which not only include standard loan 
recovery, but also factor in social indicators such as the proportion of Grameen children going to   8
school. Staff motivation is also enhanced by decentralizing significant amounts of responsibility 
to the lower tiers of the administrative structure. ASA is the best example of a lean credit delivery 
structure with high levels of decision-making authority given to field offices, from loan 
sanctioning decisions to staff human resource issues. Moreover, the structure within field offices 
is relatively flat with a branch manager who works with individual fieldworkers to resolve 
problems and typically shares living quarters with other field staff (Jain and Moore 2003). 
 
Effective internal controls are also important in ensuring effective staff performance. First of all 
the fact that financial transactions are carried out publicly, in the weekly meetings and in the 
branch offices, is a major check against any form of discretionary behavior by fieldworkers. 
Many NGOs, particularly the ones that have successfully expanded in scale, have developed 
measures that include frequently rotating staff within and between branches, regular field visits 
by senior management, a strong internal audit team and annual external audits.  
 
A fundamental part of the scaling up of Bangladesh’s NGOs and more specifically the 
microfinance movement, has been the ability to learn from experiences and adapt programs 
accordingly. This learning process takes place both through informal feedback by field staff 
during regular interactions with management as well as through a formal monitoring and 
evaluation process. BRAC’s Research and Evaluation Division has around twenty professionals 
whose key function is to evaluate BRAC’s multi-dimensional programs and give timely feedback 
to program staff and management. This process of feedback occurs through longer-term research 
as well as ‘quick-turnaround’ assessments. The shift to more flexible financial services that took 
place in recent years is largely based on adapting to client feedback and analysis of the limitations 
of a uniform microcredit model.  
 
Many of these lessons have also been shared with the rest of the microfinance industry as there 
are many examples of smaller MFIs being managed by former employees of the large MFIs. 
 
A constructive donor-client relationship 
External resources played an important part in the experimentation process, subsequent growth in 
outreach and institutional strengthening of the microfinance industry. At the same time, the large 
microfinance institutions have been successful in ‘managing donors’.  
 
Northern NGOs, such as the Ford Foundation, Oxfam and the Aga Khan Foundation, played an   9
important role at the initial stages of the NGO-MFI industry in Bangladesh. The subsequent 
expansion and consolidation stage was funded largely by official bilateral agencies
6 and later by 
multilateral agencies once Northern NGOs could not match the growing resource requirements of 
the larger MFIs. A large part of these donor investments went to the capitalization of MFIs loan 
funds, crucial to the rapid expansion that took place in the 1990s, as well as into developing 
institutional capacity through management information systems and human resource 
development. Finally, the 1990s have seen dependence on donor resources progressively 
declining for the large MFIs (see table 2).  
 
Moreover, out of BRAC’s total $160 million expenditure on development programmes in 2002, 
more than 80 percent was financed from its own resources, through the interest income on 
microcredit as well as surplus from its commercial enterprises. Two facets of these trends are 
worth highlighting. 
 
First, the decisions to subsidize these operations were not free from controversy. The advocates 
for funding these loan funds had to argue their case with officials within their own agencies who 
believed that the capital base for loan operations ought to be enhanced only by savings 
mobilization or borrowing from commercial sources. In retrospect, these decisions to help 
contribute to MFIs loan funds were by and large correct as almost all of the MFIs that received 
this support have either reached financial self-sufficiency or are well on their way to doing so. 
Donors also invested in organizational systems and MFI staff training in order to strengthen the 
capacity to administer these growing programs. 
 
Second, large NGOs in particular have been reasonably successful in “managing donors”. 
Investing in the capital base of expanding MFIs with a strategic sustainability plan required 
                                                 
6 The Department for International Development (DFID) has been one of the largest of the bilateral donors 
having provided around $130 million over a twenty year period to MFIs in Bangladesh. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Member savings 26.5 17.1 22.6 27.4 27.6 26.2 29.6
PKSF 11.8 17.1 23.2 26.0 24.0 24.6 24.2
Donors 58.8 34.2 28.0 20.6 20.4 18.9 16.6
Interest income 0.0 15.4 13.4 13.5 17.2 17.7 18.9
Commercial bank 2.9 16.2 12.8 12.6 10.8 12.6 10.7
Source: Compilied from CDF statistics (2003)
Table 2: Sources of funds for micro-credit lending (%)  10
donors with a long-term vision but crucially required MFIs who were able to persuade donors of 
the soundness of this strategy. In other countries MFIs have not been able to provide this type of 
strategic view on the best use of donor resources with the result that these resources have often 
been used to either subsidize final on-lending rates or support MFIs without a solid business plan. 
BRAC, with its large multi-faceted programs, has had a long history of working with donors and 
the evolution of this relationship is worth highlighting. Donors who have their own incentives to 
commit resources and demonstrate results on the ground, have been eager to provide resources to 
implementing organizations with a proven track record. Hence the likes of BRAC, have had to 
deal with multiple donors who each  wanted to fund specific projects.   
                                                                                                                                                                                              
These uncoordinated donor missions and disparate disbursement and reporting arrangements 
taxed BRAC’s internal capacity and led to its management proposing changes for how its donors 
ought to operate. In the early 1990s, donors shifted their approach from financing specific BRAC 
projects to financing BRAC programmes. Donors also formed a ‘consortium’ that pooled funds, 
negotiated jointly with BRAC and had common reporting requirements. An important part of the 
consortium funding arrangement and the move toward program funding has been to improve the 
predictability of resource flows – for instance BRAC secured financing for its Rural Development 
Programme for a five-year period from the donor consortium. Moreover, the establishment of a 
donor liaison office for BRAC also acts as a buffer between BRAC staff and the various visitors, 
consultants and evaluators. 
 
An enabling macroeconomic and regulatory environment 
 
The early experimentation and later scaling-up of the microfinance industry in Bangladesh was 
helped by an appropriate ‘enabling environment’. Firstly the macro-economy has been, by and 
large, soundly managed and one should not underestimate the significance of this. The rate of 
inflation has been kept to single digits and economic growth over the past decade has averaged 
around 5 percent per annum, thereby creating economic opportunities for microcredit financed 
investments.  
 
Second the Government of Bangladesh has thus far maintained a balanced approach toward 
regulating and supervising the activities of the NGO sector. This has been critical in ensuring the 
operational flexibility that is the cornerstone of service delivery by NGOs. While this long 
relationship has not been free from tensions on both sides, the Government of Bangladesh has   11
thus far been able to place the interests of the poor at the forefront while dealing with NGO 
issues. A less charitable view is that the scaling up of NGOs went largely unnoticed and once this 
took place the combined clout of large NGOs and donors has led to the Government taking on a 
largely laissez-faire approach. Ultimately the relationship between Government and NGOs also 
depends on individual personalities and social ties (Hossain 2003) as there have always been 
widely varying views regarding NGOs within the civil service and the Cabinet. Individuals  in 
key positions within Government have time and again proved instrumental in facilitating the 
growth of the microcredit sector. The early development of the Grameen project, its registration 
as a bank and the decision to grant it managerial autonomy are clear examples (Yunus 1999), as 
was the establishment of PKSF with a strong autonomous board. The prevailing consensus 
position is supportive of NGOs though accusations of involvement in party politics by a handful 
of NGOs has strained the overall Government-NGO relationship of late.  
 
Looking forward, it is clear that both the overall umbrella legislation governing NGO activities 
and the regulatory framework for microfinance need to be strengthened, particularly in light of 
the large amounts of deposits mobilized for the poor. The Central Bank, PKSF and 
representatives of MFIs are currently working to produce a set of guidelines and standards that 
will strengthen the regulatory framework for microfinance.  
 
Population density, ethnic homogeneity and religious tolerance 
 
Aside from the Chittagong Hill Tracts area, Bangladesh is ethnically a relatively homogenous 
country, with a high population density and good communication networks. Moreover this largely 
homogenous market is also very large in absolute terms. The contrast with Nepal for instance is 
striking and the difference in microcredit outreach between these two countries is partly due to 
these factors. It is also striking how in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt and certain other Muslim 
countries, MFIs have found religion to be a factor that has led to a relatively lower demand for 
microcredit and MFIs that are more cautious about expanding
7. In contrast, even conservative 
religious forces in Bangladesh have been largely tolerant of microfinance activities and the 
greater economic empowerment and mobility of women. 
 
 
                                                 
7 This point was made by Stephen Rasmussen in a personal communication.   12
A professional apex body for microfinance 
The Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) was created in 1990 and is governed by a board 
composed of both public and private sector representatives. It is a public-private apex body that 
channels funds for microfinance to MFIs has been critical in the expansion and improved 
professionalism of the microcredit industry in Bangladesh.  PKSF’s core functions include (i) 
lending money to MFIs which meet certain eligibility criteria to expand their microfinance 
operations, (ii) capacity building and hands-on assistance to strengthen MFIs and move them 
toward financial sustainability, and (iii) advocacy on microfinance issues and helping develop an 
appropriate regulatory framework for the industry.  
 
PKSF has been instrumental in contributing to the sharp increase in access in microcredit that 
took place in the 1990s by expanding the capital base for MFIs to on-lend to the poor. For 
instance, as of December 2003, PKSF loans constitute around 30 percent of ASA’s current 
revolving loan fund. PKSF is also widely credited for sharpening the focus of many MFIs toward 
financial sustainability and also in setting appropriate standards that will ease the way for a 
strengthened regulatory structure for microfinance. Moreover, PKSF’s funding arrangements are 
in line with the MFIs cash-flow requirements and the transaction costs of dealing with PKSF are 
kept to a minimum. 
 
There is a growing experience with setting up apex institutions worldwide e.g. PPAF in Pakistan, 
RMDC in Nepal, FONCAP in Argentina, LID in Bosnia-Herzegovina and MISFA in 
Afghanistan. One of the fundamental factors behind the success or failure of an apex is the 
underlying retail capacity in a particular country. The overall strength of the MFIs in Bangladesh 
has been key to PKSF’s success. An overestimation of the capacity to absorb funds by the MFIs 
on the ground is likely to lead to a failure of an apex body. However if a realistic assessment of 
the underlying retail capacity is made, then apexes offer many benefits such as the ability to 
screen MFIs on standard criteria and create a ‘level playing field’.   
    13
 
4.0. THE IMPACT OF MICROFINANCE IN BANGLADESH 
The evidence on the impact of microcredit can be assessed from two inter-related angles. Firstly 
who does credit reach and secondly how does it affect the welfare of different groups of 
individuals and households?  
 
Land ceilings, occupational criteria and asset valuations are standard targeting tools used by 
microcredit providers in Bangladesh in order to direct resources to the rural poor. These 
indicators have been shown to be relatively accurate correlates of poverty by program 
administrators who do not have the time, resources or expertise to carry out more sophisticated 
calculations of poverty for each household in their targeted area.  
 
In practice, the land criterion is the one that is more closely adhered to in the field. A large 
proportion of extremely-poor households, measured by initial landholding size,  join microcredit 
programs (Husain 1998, Zaman 1998, Khandker 2003). For instance in Khandker’s sample, sixty 
percent of the sampled members have less than twenty decimals of land.  
However, several studies also show that between 15-30 percent of microcredit members are from 
‘non-target’ households measured in terms of land (Mustafa et al 1996, Montgomery et al 1996, 
Zaman 1998, Khandker 1998)
8. However these households are typically marginal farmers and can 
be considered part of the ‘vulnerable non-poor’ group, prone to transient bouts of poverty.  
There is also evidence which suggests that households who join microcredit programs a few years 
after the village group has been established tend to be less poor compared to the members who 
join at the start of the program (Matin 1998). This feature of better-off households joining over 
time has also been noted as a general rule of thumb in many targeted anti-poverty programs 
worldwide (Lipton 1996). The presence of wealthier households does not appear to affect the 
credit supply to poor households though there is evidence to suggest that poorer households use a 
larger share of their loans for consumption purposes compared to better-off households (Halder 
and Husain 1999). The bottom line is that the literature on targeting suggests that microfinance 
programs are reasonably successful at reaching the poor, and that those households who fall 
above the stipulated landholding criterion tend to be marginally above the poverty line and are 
susceptible to transient poverty in certain years. 
                                                 
8 It is interesting to compare this figure with Copestake’s (1992) evaluation of India’s Integrated Rural 
Development Project (IRDP) where the proportion of non poor households ranged up to 36%.   14
 
The literature broadly supports the hypothesis that access to microcredit contributes to poverty 
reduction in Bangladesh though the evidence is not entirely clear-cut
9. For instance, data collected 
by the World Bank in 1992 have been used to show widely varying results depending on the 
methodology chosen to assess impact. Khandker (1998) estimates that for every 100 taka lent to a 
woman, household consumption increases by 18 taka; interestingly the figure is 11 taka if the 
same amount was lent to a man. Moderate poverty falls by around 15% and ultra-poverty by 25% 
for households who have been BRAC members for up to three years controlling for other factors 
according to the author. Similar results are found for Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural 
Development Board (BRDB) members. On the other hand, using the same data and a different 
way of correcting for selectivity bias, Morduch (1998) finds that microcredit does not have a 
significant impact on consumption levels and therefore on income poverty. Consumption data 
from 1,072 households in one district of Bangladesh are used to show that the largest effect on 
poverty occurs when a moderate-poor BRAC client borrows more than 10,000 taka ($200) in 
cumulative loans (Zaman 1998). In other words, there may be a threshold level of credit above 
which a household gains most in terms of increases in income.  
 
Recent evidence from a re-survey of the same households suggests that microcredit has 
significantly contributed to reducing poverty (Khandker 2003). Somewhat surprisingly, the 
impact appears to be greater for households who started off extremely poor (18 percentage point 
drop in extreme poverty in seven years) compared to moderate poor households (8.5 percentage 
point drop). These results differ from earlier evidence that pointed to moderate poor borrowers 
benefiting more than extremely poor borrowers due to the fact that the poorest have a number of 
constraints (fewer income sources, worse health and education etc) which prevent them from 
investing the loan in a high-return activity (Wood and Sharif 1997). This feature of better-off 
households benefiting more was also borne out by detailed case-study evidence (Farashuddin et al 
1998) and by comparing participants of credit programs who cater to different socio-economic 
groups (Montgomery et al 1996)
10. 
                                                 
9 The methodological problems associated with impact assessment of microcredit are complex. The 
literature typically uses ‘control groups’, usually ‘eligible non-members’  or ‘recently joined members’ in 
order to address the problem of the counter-factual. There have been attempts to cater for the ‘selectivity 
bias’ problem but with varying degrees of success. 
10 Montgomery et al compare the performance of BRAC borrowers with the borrowers from a Government-
run microcredit scheme, the Thana Resource Development and Employment Programme (TRDEP). 
TRDEP’s borrowers’ initial endowment conditions is shown to be higher than BRAC’s (average pre-loan 
landholding is 46 and 30 decimals for TRDEP and BRAC members respectively and the percentage of   15
 
The Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) carried out an extensive study of the 
impact of PKSF POs microcredit program using longitudinal data of 3000 households between 
1997-2000. One of the key findings was that ‘microcredit has a positive and significant effect on 
poverty status of the program households….’ (BIDS 2001 page 155). The study also finds that 
microcredit members are less vulnerable when struck by crises. Moreover improvements in other 
social indicators (child immunization, use of sanitary latrines, contraceptive prevalence) are also 
more noticeable for microcredit program members compared to non-members. 
 
There has been limited work on the aggregate poverty reduction impact of micro-credit at the 
local or national level in Bangladesh. Khandker (2003) uses the panel data discussed above to 
suggest that there is some positive externality due to micro-credit programs but that the overall 
spill-over benefits are somewhat limited. For instance, the net contribution of micro-credit on 
moderate poverty for non-participants is a small decline of 1.1 percentage points between 
1991/92 and 1998/99 compared to a decline of  8.5 percentage points by borrowers in the same 
village. The impact on extreme poverty is estimated to be somewhat greater – 4.8 percentage 
points for non-borrowers and 18.2 percentage points for borrowers over this seven year period. 
 
There is strong evidence that microcredit contributes to reducing household vulnerability. 
Morduch shows that consumption variability is 47% lower for eligible
11 Grameen households, 
54% lower for eligible BRAC households and 51% lower for eligible BRDB households 
compared to a control group.
12 This consumption smoothing is driven by income smoothing as 
evidenced by the significantly lower labor supply variability experienced by microcredit members 
compared to the control group
13. The importance of this result cannot be over-emphasized given 
the fact that seasonal deficits play a key part in the poverty process in Bangladesh (Rahman 
1995). Essentially Morduch’s results indicate that program participants do not benefit in terms of 
greater consumption levels, but they participate because they benefit from risk reduction.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
income derived from daily labour is 5% and 32% respectively) whilst the credit-delivery mechanism and 
average loan size are broadly speaking very similar. The typical TRDEP borrower’s increase in assets and 
income during the course of the most recent loan is higher than BRAC’s giving rise to the author’s 
contention that better-off borrowers benefit more than poorer borrowers. 
11 Morduch only includes households who fulfil the targeting criteria of the three organizations and labels 
them ‘eligible households’ 
12 These results are statistically significant at the 95% level. 
13 Morduch’s estimates of labour supply variability is 39-46% lower for microcredit members compared to 
a control group.   16
Asset creation is important to reduce household vulnerability to various livelihood risks. The 
findings of an impact assessment of ASA borrowers conducted in 2003 suggests that the average 
value of physical assets increased by 127% in rural areas and grew by about 150 percent in urban 
areas over a five year period. Moreover the average increase in cash savings rose by 133 percent 
and 111 percent in rural and urban areas respectively over this same five year period. Similar 
evidence is found in studies of BRAC, Grameen and PKSF’s partner organizations. 
 
Another pathway by which microfinance appears to reduce vulnerability is through the 
emergency assistance provided by many microfinance organizations during periods of acute 
natural disasters such as the recent floods in Bangladesh. The fact that these organizations turn 
into de-facto relief agencies is crucial in sustaining these households in the immediate aftermath 
of a natural disaster. Moreover the post-disaster rehabilitation assistance, in terms of both 
financial and other services, is also highly valued by microcredit clients. 
 
The pathways by which microcredit reduces vulnerability, that have been discussed here, relate to 
income and consumption smoothing and asset building. However, the impact of credit on female 
empowerment, or a reduction in ‘female vulnerability’ has also received considerable attention. 
Female empowerment in Bangladesh, can be viewed against the backdrop of ‘patriarchy’, defined 
by Cain et al (1979) as a ‘set of social relations with a material base that enables men to 
dominate women’ and hence can be thought of in terms of an improvement in intra-household 
gender relations (Naved 1994, Kabeer 1995, Hashemi et al 1996). Moreover given the institution 
of ‘purdah’ (loosely translated as ‘veil’), a pervasive social construct which restricts the female 
sphere within a typical Bangladeshi household, ‘female empowerment’ can also be viewed in 
terms of a woman’s interactions outside the homestead and the acquisition of skills, knowledge 
and confidence that such interactions can bring (Amin et al op.cit., White 1992, Mahmud 1994). 
 
Amin et al’s (1994) work in thirty six villages in Bangladesh showed that membership in 
microcredit programs positively affected a woman’s decision making role, her marital stability, 
her control over resources and mobility but has less impact on her attitude regarding marriage and 
education of their daughters. Naved (1994)
14 finds that the women credit-program participants in 
her sample felt their status had improved due to the fact that they were seen as income earners for 
the family through their access to credit.  
                                                 
14 Naved (1994) uses Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques to identify the effect of participation 
in Save The Children’s savings and credit program in Manikanj.   17
 
Hashemi et al (1996) develop an ‘empowerment index’ based on eight empowerment indicators. 
Their analysis establishes that contributing to her household's income is a significant contributing 
factor to a woman’s own empowerment. However Hashemi et al also show that credit programs 
can empower women independently of whether they contribute to family income, after 
controlling for other factors.  
 
The focus of those skeptical about the empowering effect of microcredit has been on the issue of 
women’s control over loans. Goetz et al (1996) used a sample of 253 female borrowers from four 
rural credit providers in Bangladesh. Their investigation of loan histories led the authors to 
conclude that 'About 63 percent  of the cases fall into the three categories of partial, very limited 
or no control indicating a fairly significant pattern of loss of direct control over credit' . The 
authors disaggregated their data in terms of loan activity and concluded that investing in 
traditional women's work increased their chances of being able to control the loan. Montgomery 
et al (1996) also have reservations about the ‘empowering effect’ of microcredit. Their argument 
is based largely on secondary sources and a small field survey focusing on the issue of control 
over loans. Whilst the authors admit that their sample is small, they on balance  support Goetz et 
al’s (op.cit) view that microcredit reinforces existing gender patterns and inequalities by 
promoting traditional income generation activities, which they believe do little to alter the social 
status quo.  
 
On the whole, the evidence presented by those who argue that microcredit improves female status 
within a household appears more convincing than that argued by the ‘skeptics’ camp. There are 
two main reasons for this contention. First the underlying thread of the ‘positive’ argument, that 
access to an important household resource (credit) enhances a female’s status within the 
household is both intuitively appealing and resonates with the theoretical literature on bargaining 
models of the household (Lundberg and Pollack 1993). Secondly, the focus on female control 
over loans as a key component of the ‘skeptics’ argument fails to recognize that credit enters the 
overall household income pool and that household members jointly participate in the loan 
investment. The role of several family members in managing the loan-financed investment is now 
explicitly recognized by MFIs who now give loans to women for “male-activities” such as 
rickshaw loans, that many did not permit in earlier days. 
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5.0 CONCLUDING LESSONS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 
This paper proposes six lessons from Bangladesh that could be relevant to microfinance growth 
and impact in other countries.  
 
•  First is the importance of an ‘enabling environment’ for microfinance. A critical part is 
maintaining a stable macro-economic environment with both interest rates and inflation 
kept at reasonable levels. The lack of macro-stability has seriously constrained the 
growth of microfinance in several countries, e.g. Malawi. Government regulations and 
policies are also crucial in creating the appropriate environment for the growth of the 
sector. These policies need to strike a balance between protecting the interests of 
depositors in microfinance institutions that collect savings, and not regulating the sector 
excessively with unnecessary red tape. The scaling up in Bangladesh benefited 
significantly from good communications networks – hence government investments in 
road networks is important to reduce the transaction costs of microcredit. 
 
•  A second lesson is that microcredit may be a more effective remedy against poverty and 
vulnerability if it is complemented with other interventions. These interventions may be 
particularly appropriate for the poorest households, which face the greatest risks of 
income fluctuations and have the greatest need for a range of financial and non-financial 
services. Moreover, while the provision of microcredit can enhance a woman’s status in 
the eyes of other household members, social mobilization and legal education 
interventions in conjunction with credit are likely to have a more significant effect than 
credit alone. However this does not imply that microfinance institutions ought to provide 
these services. In many cases organizations may  prefer to specialize in providing 
microfinance and facilitate linkages to providers of other non-credit interventions. 
 
•  Third, there is a role for donor financial assistance in expanding the capital base in 
emerging microfinance institutions as well as in developing technical capacity that leads 
to organizational sustainability. Hence, subsidies can be justified to support ‘infant’ 
microfinance institutions as long as there is a viable route to institutional sustainability. 
The duration of these subsidies would vary according to local conditions and level of 
poverty of the clients.  
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•  A fourth lesson is that while visionary leadership cannot simply be ‘franchised’, the 
systems and formal rules that govern the successful microfinance industry in Bangladesh 
can to an extent be replicated. These vary according to the size of the organization but by 
and large, these organizations delegate significant decision-making authority away from 
head-offices, are able to monitor individual staff performance and have linked staff 
incentives with program targets. Client feedback and program monitoring are also 
crucial. As organizations grow, the willingness to change products based on this feedback 
and to tailor products for niche markets is critical for success.  
 
•  A fifth lesson from the Bangladesh experience is that the creation of a microfinance 
wholesaler has the potential to play an important role in expanding access, developing 
professional standards and in advocating for MFI issues. However, apex bodies are not a 
panacea and a rigorous analysis of the underlying retail capacity and demand for funds 
needs to be carried out before they are established. The Bangladesh experience suggests 
that if an apex is to contribute significantly to scaling up, then it needs to ensure that the 
flow of funds is synchronized with the needs of growing MFIs, that it should have clear 
requirements for MFIs to implement solid business plans and that it should not 
overburden MFIs with high transaction costs. 
 
•  Sixth, it is clear that the bulk of the scaling up took place through four institutions that 
currently serve ninety percent of all microcredit borrowers. Hence another lesson from 
the Bangladesh experience could be that it is not necessarily a sound strategy to support 
many different institutions, and risk spreading resources thinly, in order to reach large 
numbers of poor people. This is particularly important in light of the fact that  the 
leadership skills and professional capacity required to go to scale are in limited supply in 
most countries. However, this needs to be balanced by the risks of having a concentrated 
market structure such as the industry-wide consequences of poor performance within one 
institution. A related point is that the ‘franchising’ model of setting up virtually identical 
field offices was possible due to the relatively simple credit delivery system that was 
offered at the time. The introduction of more diversified products, catering to different 
niche markets, was only introduced after the rapid expansion phase slowed down. This 
deliberate sequencing strategy for scaling up services is a notable lesson from the 
Bangladesh experience. 
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While this paper focused on the lessons from the scaling up of the microfinance industry, and its 
impact on the poor, the story would be incomplete without briefly mentioning the future 
challenges that the industry faces in Bangladesh.  
 
First, the microfinance sector needs to build a stronger domestic constituency that understands the 
economics of microfinance and in particular the reasons for why interest rates are higher than 
commercial banking rates. Demands for lowering and capping interest rates have gained ground 
in recent months and greater public debate around these issues need to be fostered. In turn the 
apex microfinance body, PKSF, has a role in improving transparency by publishing information 
on interest rates, operating costs, profit margins etc.  
 
Second, the industry needs to accept that its current operating spreads will need to shrink as donor 
grant funds for microfinance diminish and move toward more commercial sources of funding.  
Hence, MFI managers will need to balance greater efficiency with their ultimate objective, which 
is to provide quality financial services to the poor. The reduction in spreads will also imply less 
cross-subsidization of social programs that many NGO-MFIs operate, which in turn requires a 
financing strategy for these programs.  
 
A third challenge is developing an appropriate regulatory framework for the industry. Recent 
progress on this, led by the central bank, PKSF and industry representatives, needs to be built on. 
Given the large variety of institutions that exist, a tiered regulatory structure, as in the Philippines, 
is likely to be appropriate for Bangladesh. A related issue is the fact that corporate governance 
arrangements of MFIs need to be strengthened and lines of accountability made more explicit. 
 
Finally, as the competition for new microcredit clients intensifies, MFIs will need to further refine 
the services that they offer and cater to niche markets. The capacity to identify these markets and 
design appropriate products will require investments in institutional capacity building as well as 
in publicly accessible market information and research.   21
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